Poison Pills and Their Effect on Shareholder Return by Fowlkes, Katherine G
Poison Pills and Their Effect on 
Shareholder Return
Author: Katie Fowlkes






The author would like to thank Dr. Laura Cole who served as Thesis 
Advisor, and the Masters Investment Learning Center for the use of 
Bloomberg terminals to obtain proprietary data. 
This is an event study that explores stock price reaction immediately 
following a poison pill announcement. I examine the cumulative 
abnormal returns of 22 companies within the following event 
windows: the event itself and the following day (0;+1), periods of 
three (- 1; +1), five (-2; +2) and seven (-3; +3) days, and longer 
periods of pre-adoption (-15; -4) and post-adoption (+4; +15) which 
represent “neutral” times. I then compare these returns to the S&P 
500 returns, CRSP value-weighted returns, and CRSP equally-
weighted returns for the same time period.
Positive abnormal returns are attributed to the Shareholder 
Maximization Theory. Negative abnormal returns are attributed to 
the Management Entrenchment Theory.
How is company share price affected by the implementation of a 




To construct my sample of 22 companies, I utilized Bloomberg to identify companies from the S&P 500, the NASDAQ, and the 
Russell 1000 that currently had a poison pill in place. I then supplemented my data with several companies from Hurt (2016) 
to complete my sample. To then determine whether or not the event generated cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), I 
compared the returns of my companies to the returns of the S&P 500, CRSP value-weighted returns, and CRSP equally-
weighted returns for the same time period. To calculate, I utilized the Eventus software via Wharton Research Data Services 
(WRDS). Eventus is an event study program that utilizes stock data found within the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP) databases. Using this data, I found statistically significant CARs for the equally-weighted and value-weighted market 
model, and the equally-weighted market adjusted model listed below. Ten short-term event windows were studied for 
statistical significance. 
The objective of this study is to determine the cumulative abnormal 
returns (CARs) generated by the announcement of a poison pill 
plan. These CARs will allow us to understand how the stock market 
reacted to the shareholder rights plan before the official 
announcement date as well as how it reacted weeks later using 
various event windows. Studying stock price reaction to poison pill 
announcements will help further predict how firm value will be 
affected by future shareholder rights plans. This could provide 
wealth opportunities for investors.
Model Index
Market Model Equal Weighted
Market Model Value Weighted
Market Adjusted Equal Weighted
Market Adjusted Returns, Equally-Weighted Index



































































































1. P-Values are in parenthesis.
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The purpose of this event study was to further progress the 
research on shareholders rights plans and their effects on stock 
price. Some of the results of this study are in line with prior 
research, notably Hitzelberger’s (2017) “What Effect do Poison Pills 
have on Shareholder Value.” Similarly to Hitzelberger, my study 
found positive mean cumulative abnormal return for the periods (0, 
+30) and (+4, +15) of roughly 7.10% and 4.72%.
My findings differ from Hitzelberger (2017) in some ways, 
particularly surrounding the event window (-2, +2). He found highly 
significant positive abnormal returns, yet I found significant negative 
returns of -1.95% and -1.82%. When I adjust the event window to 
see if these negative returns are due simply to the aftermath of the 
announcement (period (0, +2)) I find no significant results. Thus, the 
negative returns must be spread amongst the entirety of the event 
window (-2, +2). 
1. Delve deeper into the event window (-2, +2) since the 
findings differed from some prior literature.
2. Perhaps the findings were skewed due to the addition of the 
NOL poison pills from Hurt (2016). Dividing the sample into 
subsets based on the type of shareholder rights plans might 
lead to some fascinating results.
3. Examine wider event windows. The event window (0, +30) 
produced statistically significant returns of 6.32% and 7.89%. 
























Market Adjusted Returns, Equally Weighted Index
Red bar columns represent CAR’S that were statistically significant
